Killing Floor: The Subtler Levers of the UFC Machine

In boxing, fighters set the stage. They choose an opponent, negotiate for the weight they meet at, the location of the fight, the gloves which shall be used, the date of the contest, who will referee, the length of the bout, who will judge the match, if drug testing will take place, which organization handles the drug testing, etc. These are the conditions under which a fight happens. As incredible as Floyd Mayweather and Sugar Ray Leonard were in the ring, they are both just as renowned for dealing blows at the negotiation table. Far from unique, examples of these negotiated conditions influencing the outcome of boxing matches define the sport. 

In The Rumble in the Jungle, the loose ropes of the ring and excruciating heat were both invaluable to Muhammad Ali’s victory over George Foreman. Orlando Salido’s defeat of Vasyl Lomachenko is largely chalked up to referee Lawrence Cole’s refusal to keep punches above the belt. Manny Pacquiao blamed his loss to Erik Morales in the first leg of their trilogy on the contract stipulating he wears gloves less conducive to being such an explosive puncher. Wearing his preferred gloves in the rematch, Pacquiao became the first fighter to finish Morales. In a recent what-if scenario, Wladimir Klitschko almost fought Tyson Fury on a canvas comparable to memory foam which in theory could have greatly reduced the mobility of such a fighter as Fury. Once this peculiar detail was discovered, however, Fury’s camp lobbied for and succeeded in having it removed.

These conditions are not unique to boxing alone. They are just as crucial considerations in MMA. Depending on where a fight is sanctioned, there are two different rulesets defining the legality of blows as well as the judging criteria. The UFC uses two different sizes of the octagon. There are refs with different reputations. There are commissions of variable competency. There are regions without medical examinations to certify fighters. There are judges of various repute. There are 3 round fights and 5 round fights. In the UFC in particular, contrary to boxing, these conditions are almost unilaterally dictated by the company. 

It should come as no surprise that the company’s interests frequently align with particular fighters who are the most profitable or marketable. The company’s interests also frequently fall into conflict with fighters who aren’t fan-friendly, are difficult in negotiations, are soon to be free agents, or for any other number of reasons. Here, then, is the argument: 

If:

A) The conditions of a fight contribute to its outcome .

B) The UFC controls said conditions.

C) The UFC has incentive for one fighter to beat another.

Then:

D) The UFC’s control over said conditions can be used to manipulate outcomes.

Let’s put this theory to work using the upcoming rematch between Jessica Andrade and Rose Namajunas. The fight is scheduled for 3 rounds in the UFC’s biggest cage. Andrade is a fighter who breaks people down with pressure over the course of a fight with her immense cardio and durability. Namajunas is a fighter who relies on room to move and box. She also is known for her questionable composure. In their first fight, a 5 rounder in the large cage, Andrade was gradually building momentum after an early boxing clinic from Namajunas. The gradual momentum swing accelerated abruptly when Andrade slammed Rose on her head knocking her out.

At a time when the UFC is frequently using a small cage preferable to a pressure fighter with heavy hands, this fight will take place in the large cage. At a time when lesser fighters like Jessica Eye and Cynthia Calvillo are headlining cards in 5 round fights, this fight will be a 3 rounder. With all of that in mind, it is accurate to call the conditions of the rematch favorable to Rose. Few would argue against the suggestion that she is also the more valuable of the two fighters regarding the UFC’s US-centric business model. The correlation of the UFC’s business interest with the conditions of the fight cannot be denied. The causation is left to inference.

Of course, there is plenty of historical context to guide us in this pursuit: Brock’s USADA loophole, Jon Jones pulsing, allowing Vitor Belfort to fight Jones while on PEDs, placing bounties on tough negotiators, evidence of matchmaking for/against certain fighters, slow-rolling fighters on long win streaks who aren’t necessarily popular, cutting pro-union Leslie Smith after her opponent failed to make weight, inconsistent disciplinary action such as when Conor McGregor assaulted a bus of UFC fighters, treating official losses such as that of Jose Aldo against Marlon Moraes as victories which progress their contendership, allowing champions like Michael Bisping to defend against 40 year old #13 ranked Dan Henderson, etc etc etc. It should be all-too-evident by now that the UFC frequently places its thumb on the scales.

Taking everything above into consideration, I find it perfectly reasonable to say that the UFC brass can and do use the conditions of a fight to produce outcomes favorable for their business and by extension certain fighters. Going forward, these conditions should be seen nakedly for what they are. They are not the inscrutable forces of fate. They are the calculated tools of a business that thoughtfully metabolizes its workforce. Even today’s show pony could be tomorrow’s glue.

Chris Faulkner (@ChristoFaulk)

Combat Sports Journalist